Ethiopia's Second Tigray War - Same Battlefield, Different Political Reality
Addis Abeba — In November 2020, federal forces entered Mekelle, and Addis Abeba declared the war in Tigray finished. Seven months later, Tigrayan fighters walked back into the city, and within a year they were pushing towards the capital. In October 2026, federal troops and their Tigrayan allies took Mekelle again. The government now speaks of restoring order and installing a new regional administration. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) says it will keep fighting from the mountains.
Ethiopia has seen this film before. The question is whether its leaders believe the second round will end differently. The evidence of the past six weeks suggests it will not, and for reasons that go deeper than battlefield tactics. The political landscape that made the 2020 campaign possible has collapsed. The war being fought today is a war over sovereignty: who holds power in the Ethiopian state and on whose terms. No capture of a regional capital has ever settled that question.
The argument is simple. A government can hold a city and still lose the country. Ethiopia's federal leadership is treating the recapture of territory as proof that the state's authority has been restored. In practice, each town held without political consent becomes another garrison to supply, another road to defend, and another grievance to inherit.
The coalition of 2020 no longer exists
The first Tigray war was winnable in the short term because Tigray stood almost alone. The TPLF had run the Ethiopian state for close to three decades, and its fall from power in 2018 left a long list of people who wanted it weakened. Eritrea wanted to settle an old score. Amhara forces wanted security and the return of land they regarded as theirs, above all Western Tigray. Afar authorities mobilized to repel Tigrayan incursions. Federal leaders wanted to end a rival center of power. These actors shared little except an enemy, but that was enough to surround Tigray, cut its services, and starve its supply lines.
That alignment has dissolved. After the Pretoria agreement of November 2022, the federal government moved in 2023 to disband regional special forces, and the Amhara Fano militias turned their guns on Addis Abeba. Three years later, Fano commanders sit in the same coalition as the TPLF they once fought. The founding statement of the Ethiopian Peoples' Forces Alliance for Survival was read on Tigray Television in September 2026 by Zemene Kassie, chairman of the Amhara Fano National Movement. A scene like that was unthinkable in 2021.
The Tigrayan camp has also split, and that cuts the other way. Getachew Reda, who once spoke for the TPLF at Pretoria, is now an adviser to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Government-aligned Tigrayan fighters, under the Tigray Peace Force (TPF) banner, entered Mekelle alongside federal troops. Addis Abeba has learned to fight Tigray partly with Tigrayans. That is a real advantage, but it is a borrowed one. A coalition built on the defection of individual leaders is far thinner than one built on the shared fears of entire regions.
Assab and the new regional map
Nothing has rearranged the Horn of Africa faster than Addis Abeba's demand for the sea. Since 2023, the prime minister has repeated that landlocked Ethiopia must secure direct access to the Red Sea. Senior officials, including the air force commander in October 2026, have named the Eritrean port of Assab as the goal. Asmara reads these statements as a declared intention to seize its territory, and it has said so formally in notes to the UN Security Council.
The consequences were predictable. In 2020, Eritrean troops fought beside federal forces in Tigray. In October 2026, witnesses reported Eritrean soldiers crossing into northern Ethiopia near Zalambessa, and Ethiopia responded with drone strikes on Eritrean vehicles near Adigrat. Each government now accuses the other of starting a war. Addis Abeba alleges that Asmara funds and arms the opposition. Eritrea denies backing the TPLF, but its strategic logic is plain: an Ethiopian army tied down at home is an army that cannot march on Assab.
In early October, Ethiopia expelled Eritrean diplomats, closed its embassy in Asmara, and declared 10 Eritrean diplomats persona non grata, prompting Eritrea to sever diplomatic ties. The move follows overnight explosions in Addis Abeba amid renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia. The breakdown in relations raises the risk of miscalculation and further escalation as formal diplomatic channels close.
The regional balance has shifted with it. In early October, Egypt, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan met and declared that only states with a Red Sea coastline should govern the waterway, a position widely read as a message to Ethiopia. Sudan's civil war adds another layer, with fighters, weapons, and sponsors moving across a porous border in both directions. Ethiopia's neighbors no longer need to love its rebels to help them. They only need to fear its government more.
This is the most important difference between 2020 and 2026. The first war was a domestic confrontation with a foreign ally on the government's side. The second is a domestic confrontation embedded in an interstate rivalry, and the government's own rhetoric helped build it.
Towns are not command structures
The federal military still holds clear advantages. It commands the air, it has more drones, and it has recovered Mekelle, the Afar towns lost in September, and much of Tigray's urban belt. None of that should be dismissed. But capturing a city is the easiest phase of a counterinsurgency, and the hardest phases follow.
The Tigray Defense Forces withdrew from Mekelle rather than fight for it street by street. Their leadership survived, and by mid-October they had launched a counteroffensive against federal supply lines in central Tigray. Federal units then pulled back from several localities on the Eritrean border to reinforce the interior, and Tigrayan forces reportedly moved into at least one of the towns they vacated. This is the pattern of 2021 in miniature: an army that wins the cities, then discovers that the countryside decides how long it can keep them.
The arithmetic gets harder when the other fronts are counted. Federal forces are already fighting Fano in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia. Every brigade sent to guard a Tigrayan highway is a brigade withdrawn from somewhere else. A government can advance on several maps at once while slowly running out of the soldiers, fuel, and money needed to hold any of them. If Tigrayan forces keep their command intact and keep cutting roads, Addis Abeba will face a choice it cannot win cheaply: pour more troops into Tigray or contain the advances in Amhara and on the approaches to the capital.
A coalition built on the defection of individual leaders is far thinner than one built on the shared fears of entire regions."
None of this makes a rebel victory inevitable. The Alliance for Survival has no named joint commander; its members are separated by hundreds of kilometers, and several of them are militarily weak. A cascade of federal reversals is a possible scenario, not a forecast. The point is narrower. The government's current gains do not amount to the end of the war, and treating them as if they did repeats the error of November 2020.
Whose state?
Beneath the military campaign lies an older belief: that whoever controls the center must keep it at any cost, because losing power means losing safety. Ethiopia's modern history gives that belief some grounding. The imperial order and the Derg both fell to armed rebellion, and the collapse of the TPLF-led coalition was followed by war within two years. Each change of regime brought reprisals against the communities associated with the old one.
That history now shapes how parts of the political class defend the present government. For some Oromo elites, an administration led by an Oromo prime minister has become a guarantee of their community's place in the state, even when its conduct contradicts the democratic demands that brought it to power in 2018. In this view, sharing power looks like surrender, and criticism looks like an attack on the community itself.
The flaw in this reasoning is that a leader's ethnicity does not make the state belong to the people who share it. Oromia itself is a battlefield. The Oromo Liberation Army has fought federal forces there since 2018, and it now sits in the Alliance for Survival on the argument that the government betrayed Oromo self-determination. Ordinary Oromo farmers face drone strikes, forced recruitment, and disrupted markets like everyone else. Binding a community's future to one government's survival leaves that community exposed when the government falls, and it pushes neighbouring communities to see it as an obstacle rather than a partner.
The same trap exists on every side. Tigrayan, Amhara, and Somali politicians have each, at different moments, told their people that only control of a particular government could keep them safe. Ethiopia will not find stability until no community needs to own the state in order to survive inside it.
What the opposition owes Ethiopians
Criticism of the government does not amount to an endorsement of its armed opponents. The Alliance for Survival unites groups that killed each other's fighters and displaced each other's civilians only a few years ago. Its members have agreed on one goal, the removal of the Prosperity Party government and a transitional administration, and they have set aside almost everything else. Alliance representatives have said openly that territorial disputes have been tabled until after victory.
That is the coalition's weakest point. Western Tigray is claimed by both Tigrayan and Amhara leaders. Afar and Somali and Oromo communities contest land along their shared boundary. Wartime atrocities committed by federal, TPLF, Fano, and Eritrean forces have never been accounted for. A coalition that cannot say how it will settle these questions is asking Ethiopians to trade one war for the promise of another. The alliance's founding proclamation commits members to resolving disputes through dialogue. Its credibility will rest on whether it publishes concrete terms on territory, civilian protection, and accountability before it asks anyone to fight for it.
A different measure of victory
The costs of the current course fall far from the front line. About three-quarters of a million people were still displaced inside Tigray before the September fighting began. Recruitment drives empty villages, military spending crowds out schools and clinics, and inflation erodes household budgets across the country. A prolonged war consumes the money Ethiopia would need for recovery while producing the grievances that feed the next rebellion.
Ethiopia's partners can help by changing what they count. The African Union, the United States, the Gulf states, and the European Union have tended to follow the war through maps, which town fell this week and which road reopened. A better yardstick is civilian safety, humanitarian access, and whether any party is offering credible political terms. Pressure on Addis Abeba and Asmara to step back from the Assab confrontation matters just as much, because a war between the two states would draw in Egypt, Sudan, and the Gulf and shut the door on any internal settlement.
The way out is not mysterious. It requires an inclusive national dialogue that the armed opposition can actually join, a renegotiated political settlement that protects the rights of Ethiopia's nations and nationalities while keeping the state intact, and a security arrangement in which losing an election does not mean losing protection. None of that is easy. All of it is easier than a third capture of Mekelle.
In 2020, Ethiopia's leaders believed that taking a city would close a political question. Six years later, the city has changed hands again, and the question is larger than ever. Holding Mekelle is within the government's reach. Holding the country requires something the army cannot deliver: the consent of the people who live in it. AS
Read the original article on Addis Standard.