East Africa: The Race for the Red Sea

The Red Sea is emerging as a contested geopolitical corridor where African states are pursuing maritime access and sovereignty, Gulf powers are expanding their economic and political influence, and global powers are positioning themselves to protect strategic shipping routes.

These competing ambitions are increasingly intersecting with regional conflicts, creating a new security challenge for the Horn of Africa and the wider East African region.

The Red Sea is a narrow, elongated strip of water stretching roughly 2,250 kilometers from southeast to northwest, separating northeast Africa from the Arabian Peninsula.

Renowned for its extreme heat, hypersalinity, and dazzling marine life, it serves as one of the world's most critical maritime trade arteries.

But it is also a military corridor, an energy route, an intelligence environment and a diplomatic faultline. The sea is framed by six primary nations. Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti sit on its western African coast, while Saudi Arabia and Yemen border its eastern Asian coast.

At its northern end, the sea splits into two narrow fingers around the Sinai Peninsula: the Gulf of Suez to the west (which feeds directly into the human-made Suez Canal) and the Gulf of Aqaba to the east.

At its southern bottleneck, the sea flows through the narrow Bab-el-Mandeb strait (Gate of Tears) into the Gulf of Aden, which connects directly out to the open Indian Ocean.

Along the Horn of Africa's coastline, competition over ports, military access and maritime trade is drawing Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti and Eritrea into a complex contest, while Gulf states and global powers seek influence over the routes connecting Africa to Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

What began as Ethiopia's search for an alternative maritime outlet has evolved into a wider contest over the economic and strategic future of the Horn of Africa.

The stakes are particularly high between Ethiopia and Eritrea, whose relations have deteriorated sharply amid growing tensions over maritime access and security in the Horn of Africa.

On October 1, Ethiopia announced the closure of its embassy in Asmara and declared 10 Eritrean diplomats in Addis Ababa persona non grata, ordering them to leave within 48 hours.

Addis Ababa accused the diplomats of engaging in activities that threatened its national security and cited what it described as Eritrea's direct and indirect acts of hostility. Eritrea retaliated by severing diplomatic relations, accusing Ethiopia of pursuing a longstanding policy of interference and aggression.

At the heart of the dispute is Ethiopia's determination to secure reliable access to the sea. Since Eritrea's independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been landlocked and heavily dependent on Djibouti, through which approximately 95 per cent of its external trade transits.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly described maritime access as a strategic necessity, while his government's interest in securing access to Eritrean ports, particularly Assab, has fuelled fears in Asmara that Addis Ababa could ultimately seek to acquire territory by force.

Ethiopia's government has maintained that it seeks a peaceful resolution to the issue, but the possibility of military confrontation has become an increasingly prominent concern.

The danger, however, extends beyond a bilateral dispute. In a February 2026 briefing, the International Crisis Group warned that renewed hostilities involving Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray could overlap with Sudan's ongoing war, drawing in Egypt and Gulf states that are already aligned with competing regional actors.

The organisation noted that Eritrea has cultivated ties with Sudan's army and Egypt, while Ethiopia has developed close relations with the United Arab Emirates, which Crisis Group identifies as a supporter of Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It cautioned that these competing relationships could turn a confrontation in the Horn into a wider regional struggle.

The warning has since become more urgent. In an October 1 analysis, Chatham House researchers Ahmed Soliman and Abel Abate Demissie cautioned that renewed fighting in Tigray could spill across Ethiopia's borders into Eritrea and Sudan.

Susanne Stollreiter, head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's Ethiopia office, also told Deutsche Welle that the involvement of external actors with their own interests in the region could turn an escalation into a wider conflagration across the Horn.

There are now heightened fears that Ethiopia's overlapping internal conflicts and tensions with Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan could trigger a broader regional conflict involving Middle Eastern powers.

Somaliland's pursuit of international recognition adds another dimension. On Nov. 1, Israel confirmed that its first ambassador to Somaliland, Michael Lotem, had presented his credentials to President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi in Hargeisa, following Israel's recognition of Somaliland as an independent state on December 26, 2025.

The ceremony, accompanied by the laying of a cornerstone for a planned Israeli embassy, formalised a relationship that challenges the longstanding international position recognising Somaliland as part of Somalia. Mogadishu has rejected the move, accusing Israel of violating Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Beyond the diplomatic implications, Israel's engagement with Somaliland has raised questions about the strategic importance of the territory's location along the Gulf of Aden, close to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Yemen's Houthi-controlled coastline.

Since late 2023, the Houthis have attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, saying their campaign is in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.

Analysts have suggested that closer ties with Somaliland could give Israel a strategic partner near the maritime corridor and improve its ability to monitor or respond to Houthi activity.

However, reports of a potential Israeli military presence in Somaliland remain contested, and analysts say that diplomatic recognition should not be treated as evidence that a military basing agreement exists.

Sudan War

The war in Sudan has added another volatile theatre to the contest for influence over the Red Sea. Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which erupted in April 2023, has killed tens of thousands of people, with some estimates putting the death toll -- including indirect deaths -- at between 300,000 and 400,000. It has also created the world's largest displacement crisis.

The conflict has increasingly drawn in regional powers with competing interests. The United Arab Emirates has been accused of supporting the RSF while Egypt has emerged as a key supporter of the SAF.

Saudi Arabia, which shares a strategic interest in stability across the Red Sea, has maintained close ties with Sudan's military leadership and played a prominent role in diplomatic efforts to end the war.

Iran has also strengthened its relationship with the SAF, including through the supply of combat drones, while Russia has sought to deepen its engagement with Sudan's military authorities. These relationships have turned the conflict into part of a wider struggle for influence in the Horn of Africa and across the Red Sea.

Sudan's approximately 850-kilometre Red Sea coastline gives the conflict significance beyond its borders. The SAF retains control of Port Sudan, the country's principal seaport and a critical gateway for international trade.

As the war has weakened state institutions and created a security vacuum, external powers have sought to expand their strategic relationships with Sudan, raising questions about future access to ports and the possibility of a longer-term military presence along the coast.

The conflict is also unfolding against a backdrop of wider maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including attacks on commercial shipping linked to the war in Gaza and the Houthi campaign in Yemen. Sudan's naval special forces operate in the central Red Sea as part of security alliances to guard against spillover.

Sudan's position on this corridor, and the military relationships it is developing, therefore carry implications for the security of one of the world's most important shipping routes.

Beyond Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing competing strategies to shape the Red Sea's political and economic order. Both seek influence over strategic ports, maritime trade routes and security partnerships, but their approaches differ.

The UAE has built an extensive network of commercial relationships across the Horn, including its investment in Berbera port in Somaliland through DP World, while Saudi Arabia has increasingly emphasised partnerships with recognised governments, regional security cooperation and the protection of state sovereignty.

Their rivalry is also shaped by the need to secure alternative energy export routes and protect investments along the Red Sea. For African coastal states, competition between the two Gulf powers brings opportunities for infrastructure financing, investment and security assistance, but also risks importing Gulf rivalries into already fragile regional relationships.

Uganda's planned withdrawal of Somalia in 2027 is also part of the changing regional security architecture. It raises questions about the future of the security arrangements underpinning stability in a country whose coastline overlooks the Gulf of Aden, the maritime gateway to the Red Sea.

Djibouti factor

Djibouti, a country of just over one million people and smaller than Rwanda, occupies an outsized position in Red Sea geopolitics. It hosts military bases belonging to the United States, China, France, Japan and Italy, making it one of the world's most concentrated foreign military hubs.

It is also the only country to host permanent military bases belonging to both Washington and Beijing, placing the forces of the world's two leading powers within close proximity.

Its strategic value begins with geography. Situated beside the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow maritime passage linking the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, Djibouti overlooks one of the world's most important shipping corridors.

Its location also places it at the intersection of the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, making it an ideal platform for military logistics, force projection and maritime surveillance.

Djibouti's strategic importance is also reflected in the diplomacy taking place on its soil. On April 23, 2025, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi travelled to Djibouti for talks with President Ismail Omar Guelleh, where the two leaders called for Red Sea and Gulf of Aden littoral states to retain primary responsibility for the security and governance of the maritime corridor.

The meeting carried a wider regional significance. As Ethiopia intensified its campaign for direct access to the sea, the two presidents were signalling that decisions over the Red Sea's security architecture should remain in the hands of countries bordering it.

Their discussions also produced agreements that included an Egyptian logistics hub in Djibouti's Free Economic Zone, extending Cairo's economic and strategic presence in the country.

Djibouti has turned its geography into a source of economic and diplomatic leverage. Through military leases, access agreements and related arrangements, it earns substantial revenue from foreign military installations, with estimates putting annual income from its security-rentier model at more than $100 million.

More importantly, its government retains the authority to negotiate the terms under which foreign powers operate on its territory. Washington, Beijing and other capitals therefore depend on Djibouti not only for physical access to the region but also for the diplomatic relationships that sustain their military presence.

Yet this concentration of rival forces presents a strategic dilemma. Djibouti benefits from hosting competing powers, but their proximity also places the country at the intersection of wider geopolitical tensions.

As US-China rivalry intensifies, the coexistence of their military installations raises questions about the risks of confrontation, intelligence competition and the possibility that tensions elsewhere could spill into the Horn of Africa. Djibouti's greatest strategic asset -- its ability to host rival powers -- could also become a source of vulnerability.

Houthi power

Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi movement has become one of the most consequential actors in Red Sea geopolitics, demonstrating how a regional armed group can disrupt a global maritime artery.

Since November 2023, its attacks on commercial shipping have threatened traffic through the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Armed with anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range drones and explosive uncrewed surface vessels, the Houthis have developed the capacity to threaten vessels far beyond Yemen's coastline.

Their attacks have not amounted to a complete closure of the strait, but have imposed substantial risks on commercial shipping, particularly vessels with Israeli, American or British connections and, more recently, Saudi-affiliated shipping. The movement has also threatened vessels linked to companies doing business with Israel, prompting shipping operators to reassess the risks of transiting the corridor.

The consequences have extended well beyond the region. Major shipping companies have diverted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding days or weeks to some journeys, increasing freight and insurance costs and disrupting supply chains.

The Suez Canal, which normally handles a significant share of global maritime trade, has suffered a sharp decline in traffic and revenue. UN Trade and Development reported that by May 2025, tonnage passing through the canal remained 70 per cent below its 2023 level.

The threat also extends across the Gulf of Aden into the Horn of Africa. A 2025 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen documented growing cooperation between the Houthis and Somalia's al-Shabaab, including weapons transfers, smuggling networks and reported training in drone technology and explosives.

The panel described an increasingly organised relationship that could extend the reach of both groups across the maritime corridor.

The combination of missile and drone attacks, illicit arms transfers and the threat to commercial shipping has made the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden a focus of international naval operations.

Countries along the African coastline face the challenge of securing a maritime corridor whose instability can be triggered by conflicts and armed groups operating on either side of the sea.

The Red Sea's strategic importance has always rested on geography. What is changing is the number of actors capable of turning that geography into leverage from governments and global powers to armed movements with missiles, drones and access to the coastline.

Read the original article on Independent (Kampala).