Tanzania: Spotlight on Fuel Security

When the Iran-United States war began on 28 February 2026, its shockwaves hit East Africa almost immediately. Major oil actors declared force majeure, freight and insurance costs surged, and fuel availability was erratic at best. For a region where most countries import the bulk of their refined petroleum, this was a direct threat to food supply chains, hospitals, transport networks, and the overall functioning of nation-states.

Against that backdrop, Tanzania's response to the crisis deserves close examination. Of the interventions rolled out across the region, the country’s has been among the more decisive. In March, a joint task force was formed, bringing together the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), the Petroleum Bulk Procurement Agency (PBPA), the energy regulator, EWURA, and security agencies.

 TPDC was tasked with taking over emergency bulk imports between May and July, negotiating directly with suppliers under wartime conditions to safeguard fuel supplies and keep the country working and operating.

 The strategy appears to have worked. Tanzania avoided the queues, rationing, and acute shortages that hit several import-dependent economies elsewhere. Pricing tells a similar story. Following EWURA's July cap-price review, Dar es Salaam retailers are now capped at TZS 3,990 per litre for petrol and TZS 4,182 for diesel, down TZS 96 and TZS 151 respectively from June.

 Across the border, the picture looks different. Kenyan motorists are paying KES 214.03 for super petrol and KES 222.86 for diesel in Nairobi, figures that convert to roughly TZS 4,340 and TZS 4,520 at prevailing exchange rates. That's despite Kenya extending an 8% VAT relief on fuel and drawing down its Petroleum Development Levy fund specifically to hold prices steady. On these numbers, Tanzanian consumers have been paying somewhere in the region of TZS 340–350 less per litre than their Kenyan counterparts, a gap that has persisted through several pricing cycles.

 It isn't only on price that Tanzania has come out ahead. At the height of the crisis, Kenya's fuel security came under such strain that it had to formally request help from Uganda to manage its supply. That ask showed that managing price alone is not a sufficient response to a supply-side shock of this kind. Availability has to be secured first. Without it, price controls simply mask a shortage, and it is availability that keeps hospitals stocked, transport moving, and schools open.

 With ceasefire efforts still faltering and the Strait of Hormuz effectively throttled for the foreseeable future, East Africa is not out of this crisis. Countries in the region will keep facing hard choices between cost, supply security, and fiscal exposure. Tanzania’s approach of coordinated action across TPDC, PBPA and EWURA, backed by a willingness to negotiate directly and aggressively for supply looks like the more durable model. Other governments in the region, still managing this crisis one day at a time, would do well to study it.